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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
\ 
STATE OF UTAH, I 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. I AUGUST SCHREIBER, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 773 7 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Except to the extent that the record will support the 
State's assertion that the defendant procured the order of the 
trial court, dated October 20, 1949, through misrepresentations 
sufficient to warrant setting aside of that order, defendant's 
statement of the facts of the case is complete and correct, and 
we accept it. 
The State's position is this: any court has inherent power 
to set aside an order it has made when that order is procured 
~· 
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through fraud,· deceit, or misrepresentation. The order of the 
trial court made October 20, 1949, setting aside the conviction 
of defendant and dismissing the action was entered upon 
certain representations being made to the trial court by de-
fendant as to the necessity of that order. The record itself, 
regardless of what might be considered extra-judicial reports 
coming to the attention of the trial judge, will support the 
fact that these representations were false when made, and 
therefore the court had jurisdiction to revoke the order made 
upon such misrepresentations. 
A good argument may be made that the amendment to 
section 105-36-17, Utah Code Annotated 1943, by Chapter 
24, Laws of Utah 1943, does violence to the pardoning power 
as set forth in Article VII, Section 12, Utah Constitution. Under 
the 1943 amendment, after a defendant has been placed upon 
probation, the district court "may if it be compatible with the 
public interest either upon motion of the district attorney or 
of its own motion terminate the sentence or set aside the 
plea of guilty or conviction of the defendant, and dismiss the 
action and discharge the defendant." (Emphasis added.) 
Action taken under the emphasized portion of the statute 
quoted would appear to be an exercise of the pardoning 
power, and we doubt that such action may. be allowed a trial 
court under the constitutional provision for the Board of Par-
dons. Indeed, this is the theory upon which the district attorney 
sought to have set aside the order of October 20, 1949, setting 
aside the conviction of the defendant, dismissing the action, 
and discharging him (R. 57-58). The trial court did not 
enter its order of June 9, 1951, vacating the order of October 
20, 1949, on this theory (R. 107-108), but rather, based his 
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action upon the proposition that the earlier order was obtained 
through misrepresentation of the intent of the defendant and 
the facts and circumstances surrounding his case. We believe 
that the order of the trial court made June 9, 1951, vacating 
its order of October 20, 1949, setting aside defendant's con-
viction and dismissing the action, was properly based upon 
the fact that the latter order was procured through misrepre-
sentations made to the court, and this court need not therefore 
consider the constitutional quesion. We shall, therefore, present 
this one point only. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I. 
A COURT HAS INHERENT JURISDICTION TO VA-
CATE AN ORDER MADE BY IT WHEN THAT ORDER 
IS PROCURED THROUGH FRAUD, DECEIT OR MISREP-
RESENTATIONS. THE ORDER SETTING ASIDE DE-
FENDANT'S CONVICTION AND DISMISSING THE 
ACTION WAS BASED UPON MISREPRESENTATIONS 
MADE TO THE TRIAL COURT, WHICH ARE SHOWN 
ON THE RECORD, AND THAT COURT THEREFORE 
ACTED PROPERLY IN VACATING ITS ORDER. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
A COURT HAS INHERENT JURISDICTION TO VA-
CATE AN ORDER MADE BY IT WHEN THAT ORDER 
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IS PROCURED THROUGH FRAUD, DECEIT OR MISREP-
RESENTATIONS. THE ORDER SETTING ASIDE DE-
FENDANT'S CONVICTION AND DISMISSING THE 
ACTION WAS BASED UPON MISREPRESENTATIONS 
MADE TO THE TRIAL COURT, WHICH ARE SHOWN 
ON THE RECORD, AND THAT COURT THEREFORE 
ACTED PROPERLY IN VACATING ITS ORDER. 
The general rule in civil cases is that a judgment pro-
cured through fraud, deceit, or misrepresentations may be 
vacated by the court. }1 Am. Jur. p. 282, Sec. 738, "Judg-
ments." The same rule applies in criminal matters. In the case 
of Lyons v. Goldstein, 47 N. E. 2d 425, 290 N. Y. 19, the 
court stated: 
The inherent power of a court to set aside its judg-
ment which was procured by fraud and misrepresen-
tation cannot be doubted. (Cases cited) . No logical 
distinction can be made between such power over judg-
ments in civil cases and such power over judgments in 
criminal cases. There is notping unique about a judg-
ment or its execution in criminal cases which excepts it 
from the rules applicable to judgments generally and 
the inherent powers ·of the courts with . reference to 
them. 
See also People ex rei. Walsh on Behalf of Katz v. Ashworth, 
Warden, 56 N.Y. S. 2d 791. Taking this to be the applicable 
rule, we shall review the records of the hearings held October 
20, 1949, and June 9, 1951, to show wherein the order of 
October 20, 1949, setting aside the conviction of defendant, 
dismissing the action, and discharging defendant from the 
supervision of the State Parole Department was obtained by 
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misrepresenting to the trial court the facts and circumstances 
surrounding defendant's application for the order of October 
20, 1949, setting aside his conviction and dismissing the action 
against him. 
The testimony of Dr. Henning on the two hearings is 
illustrative of this. On the hearing of October 20, 1949, after 
testifying to the physical condition of defendant, that witness 
testified as follows (R. Ex. A, p. 2-3): 
Q. And what is the remedy for that? 
A. Well, of course the immediate remedy is usually 
sedatives and rest but the permanent remedy is 
also a great deal of rest and lower altitudes and 
more regular atmosphere; warmer and not too 
changeable. 
Q. And would you say that Dr. Schreiber's health 
would increase definitely if he was in a lower alti-
tude and more constant warm climate? 
A. I would say yes. 
* * * * 
THE COURT: Doctor, do you recommend that Dr. 
Schrieber be transferred or be permitted to go to 
a lower climate? 
A. At least for quite some time. 
THE COURT: And do you think his rematmng in 
Utah would be detrimental to his health? 
A. At least in the wintertime would be. 
There is a sense of positiveness and urgency here. The recitals 
introductory to the order signed the same day also indicate 
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this sense of urgency for the sake of the health of defendant 
and his son (R. 63-64). Yet defendant did not leave for 
Florida until well into the month of December, 1949, and 
then only when the trial judge had indicated he was contemplat-
ing reconsidering the order of October 20, 1949 (R. 108). 
On the hearing held June 9, 1951, at which Dr. Henning's 
testimony was subject to cross-examination-it was not on 
October 20, 1949, (R. 94-95 )-he was not nearly so positive 
as to the necessity for defendant living in a lower altitude 
or more stable climate (R. 101) ; 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
By Mr. Roberts: 
Q. At the time you examined him, I think it was in 
September, 1949, you were of the opinion that what 
he should do was move to a lower climate-we 
can call it a lower climate? 
A. Well, it usually helps people to be in a little lower 
altitude, ·who are extremely upset emotionally. 
Q. And it was your opinion then if he would go to a 
lower altitude that his physical condition would 
improve? 
A. And I thought it would help quite a bit to get away 
from here, and be in a lower altitude. 
Q. At that time you thought the climate and altitude 
he would find in Florida would be extremely bene-
ficial to his health? 
A. At that time that is what I thought. 
8. 
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Q. Is there anything that would change your mind 
at the present time? 
A. He didn't seem to get any better. I was in constant 
communication with him, through his letters, and 
he informed me he wasn't getting any better, and, 
in fact, asked me several times if I couldn't come 
down. 
At the hearing October 20, 1949, the defendant testified 
that he intended to leave the state of Utah permanently and 
take up residence in Florida. We quote from the record, Ex-
hibit A, page 4: 
Q. Now, Dr. Schrieber, when you are able to do so, 
it is your plan to leave the State of Utah perma-
nently and go where? 
A. To the state of Florida. 
Q. And you would take your son with you? 
A. Yes. 
This defendant conveniently forgot at the hearing held June 9, 
1951. We quote from the record, p. 78-79: 
Q. And you recall the proceedings that were had in 
court the 20th day of October, 1949, at the time 
when Mr. Maw represented you in this transaction, 
with reference to having the order setting aside the 
conviction obtained in this case? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you recall at that time, do you not, that you 
represented to the court it was your intention per-
manently to leave the state of Utah? 
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A. I don't remember what it was. 
Q. Well, wasn't it a fact at that time you said it was 
your intention to permanently leave the state of 
Utah? 
A. It was my intention to leave Utah, yes. 
Q. Permanently leave? 
A. Permanently wasn't definite. I wasn't told to go. 
Q. Do you recall the matter of your permanently leav-
ing the state was discussed during those proceed-
ings? 
A. I don't recall exactly any more. 
Q. Didn't your counsel, Mr. Maw, represent to the 
court you would leave the state and you would stay 
away permanenlty from the state because of your 
health, and practice your profession in Florida? 
A. He said I would leave the state for my health, but 
I dont' recall I would leave permanently. 
The record further shows that the trial judge, in granting the 
order of October 20, 1949, setting aside the conviction of 
defendant and dismissing the charge against him, took this 
extraordinary action upon a belief, given him by representa-
tions made by defendant's counsel, Mr. Maw, that defendant 
was going to a lucrative position which his health would 
permit him to occupy, and which would enable him to become 
established in his profession in Florida. Mr. Maw testified 
to this on direct examination (R. 89), and upon examination 
by the trial co1_.1rt (R. 9 3-94). Yet defendant knew nothing 
of this when he was examined thereon by the court on June 
9, 1951. We quote from the record, page 85-86: 
10 
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EXAMINATION BY THE COURT 
* * * * 
Q. Now, at the time you left here you had a job in a 
hospital in Florida that was going to pay you about 
three hundred a month for about two or three 
hours' work a day? 
A. No, I didn't. 
Q. Didn't you have such a job as that? 
A. No, I was very ill at ~at time. I was going to open 
an office there. 
Q. Would it surprise you if I told you Dr. Maw told 
me you had a job in Florida, that would pay you 
practically three hundred a month for two or three 
hours' work a day-that would surprise you? 
A. That would surprise me. 
Q. It would if I told you that? 
A. Yes, it would. 
when examined further along this line by his counsel, Mr. Maw, 
defendant's memory simply failed him (R. 86): 
Q. Mr. Schreiber, don't you remember telling me in 
Miami, Florida, there was a possibility of your hav-
ing a job in a hospital down there, or some place, 
where you would have a basic income when you 
came, and you discussed this matter with me? 
A. I just don't recall. I said I could get it if I will go 
down there. I have a license there, I am sure I 
could get a position down there. 
Q. That is, a position where you could work part time, 
and carry on your pJ:ofession? 
A. I don't recall that, exactly. 
11 
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Q. Do you remember discussing anything like that 
with me, at all? 
A. I can't recall that, that I mentioned I would get a 
job down there, get a job in a hospital-! don't 
just recall it-1 just don't know. 
When defendant was passing through Utah in November, 
1950, and wished to determine his status within this state, he 
did not, as one would who is presumably acting in good faith 
under the circumstances, consult the judge whose order he 
wanted interpreted. Rather he went to another judge who 
had had nothing to do with his case (R. 81, 88). He apparently 
gave the judge who had ordered the setting aside of his con-
viction a wide berth. This, as noted by Judge Van Cott, does 
not impress one that the defendant was acting in good faith 
(R. 110). 
It should be further noted that defendant's health, for 
-some strange reason, began improving for the first time after 
he returned to Utah (R: 83, 99, 100-101). Further, defendant 
made no effort to establish a practice either in Florida or Cali-
fornia (R. 99) . 
The entire record dealing with the order of October 20, 
1949, and the subsequent proceedings whereby that order was 
revoked show that the trial judge was misled in granting that 
order. That order is extraordinary in that it sets aside a con-
viction upon a verdict, dismisses the action, and discharges the 
defendant. It has the effect of wiping the slate clean, leaving 
the defendant. with a clear record. The trial court could as 
easily have continued defendant on probation under the super-
vision of the Adult Probation and Parole Department, and 
12 
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allowed defendant to seek out-of-state supervision under the 
Uniform Out-of-State Supervision Act, Sections 85-9-81 to 
85-9-84, Utah Code Annotated 1943, and the compact be-
tween this state and Florida in effect at that time. Rather, 
it chose to act under the power granted it by the amendment 
made to section 105-36-17, Utah Code Annotated 1943, by 
Chapter 24, Laws of Utah 1943, permitting trial courts to "set 
aside the plea of guilty or conviction of the defendant, and 
dismiss the action and discharge the defendant." One can 
only assume that the trial court acted thus on a belief, en-
gendered by defendant, that it was his intent to move to 
Florida permanently to rehabilitate himself and the health 
of him and his son, and that such a move was urgent and in-
dispensable. Yet within eight months after leaving the state, 
the defendant was returned, located in a home, and preparing 
to resume a professional practice, his health improving only 
since that return! We believe that the .record, apart from any 
extra-judicial utterances and statements that might have been 
considered by the trial judge, clearly indicates that the de-
fendant never, at any time, actually intended to go to Florida 
or California or anywhere except for a long enough period 
for the matter to "blow over" so that he could re-establish 
a practice in Salt Lake City with the clear record given him 
by the court based upon his misrepresentations. 
Defendant urges in his brief that if the order of October 
20, 1949, was conditioned upon his remaining out of the state 
permanently and in any event, it would be a condition of 
banishment, and therefore void. We have no quarrel with this. 
That is, we agree with defendant's statement of the law that 
an order of banishment is void as against public policy. 
13 
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However, to assume that the trial judge revoked the order 
of October 20, 1949, setting aside the conviction of defendant 
and dismissing the action against him, simply because he re-
turned to this state, is to misconstrue the theory upon which 
the trial judge was acting in revoking that order. That judge 
revoked his earlier order because it was shown to him that 
that order was procured in bad faith and upon misrepresenta-
tions as to the facts and intent of defendant at the time the 
order issued. Defendant's early return to the state was merely 
a circumstance which, along with others, indicated that he had 
been thus acting in bad faith. Such was the consideration of 
the trial judge (R. 111). 
Defendant has cited the case of In re Flint, 25 Utah 338, 
71 P. 5 31, for authority that the trial court, by its order setting 
aside the conviction of defendant, dismissing the action against 
him, and discharging him, lost jurisdiction of the case and 
could not thereafter reconsider that order. We submit that 
that case is not in point here. In the Flint case the trial court, 
after the defendant had been convicted, but before he had 
been sentenced, ordered the sentence indefinitely suspended, 
and released defendant upon his own recognizance. The trial 
court subsequently · had defendant arrested, brought before 
him, sentenced him, and defendant was committed. Upon 
habeas corpus, this court simply held that the trial court, on 
these facts, lost jurisdiction, and the sentence therefore was 
void. There is no indication that the order of the trial court 
in the Flint case was procured by misrepresentations made to 
the trial court, nor is there any indication whatsoever that 
this proposition of law was considered. Here, defendant had 
been sentenced, and was in the process of serving the sentence 
14 
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in the manner prescribed by the court. Through misrepresen-
tation of his intent and the facts and circumstances surround-
ing his case, he procured an order setting aside his conviction 
and discharging him. Because of these misrepresentations, the 
trial court did not lose jurisdiction of the case. "The inherent 
power of a court to set aside its judgment which was procured 
by fraud and misrepresentation cannot be doubted." Lyons 
v. Goldstein, supra. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant in this appeal urges that the order of 
October 20, 1949, setting aside the conviction of the defendant, 
dismissing the action against the defendant, and discharging 
him is based upon a valid act of the legislature, was final and 
unconditional, divesting the court of jurisdiction, and that the 
trial court was without power to revoke that order. He fur-
ther urges that the order of June 9, 1951, setting aside the 
order of October 20, 1949, is void and beyond the power of 
the trial court for the reason that the court considered extra-
judicial utterances and statements as a basis therefor. He also 
claims that the condition upon which the order of October 20, 
1949, was granted is void because it in effect constitutes ban-
ishment. 
The theory of the State is that the order of October 20, 
1949, setting aside the conviction of the defendant, dismissing 
the action against him, and discharging him was procured by 
the defendant through misrepresentations as to his intent pro-
vided that order be granted, and as to the facts and circum-
15 
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stances surrounding his case at that time. These misrepresen-
tations may not have constituted fraud in the legal sense, but 
they were sufficient to show that the defendant was not dealing 
honestly with the trial court (R. 111). 
We respectfully submit that the record shows this ab-
sence of good faith on the part of the defendant in procuring 
the order of the court of October 20, 1949. We further re-
spectfully submit that the court has inherent jurisdiction to 
vacate such an order upon those facts and that the trial court 
in this instance acted properly and within its jurisdiction. This 
being so, this court need not consider other questions raised, 
but should affirm the order of the trial court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
16 
CLINTON D. VERNON 
Attorney General 
ALLEN B. SORENSEN 
Assistant Attorney General 
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